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Abstract 
We analyse the role that the liberalisation of temporary contracts plays in labour share in 
some EU countries. The empirical analysis mainly relies on the EUKLEMS database and 
applies a difference-in-difference approach. Our results, focused on periods of different 
length (1996–2007 and 1996–2013), show that legislative innovations that favour the 
extensive use of temporary contracts negatively affect the labour share, likely because they 
lower employees’ average compensations. We hypothesize that these labour reforms, which 
lead to enduring skill deficits and job instability, have influenced the functional distribution 
of income, thus failing to halt the erosion of the labour share of previous decades.  
 
Keywords: factor income distribution, labour regulation 
JEL Classifications: E25; J50. 
Introduction 
The slowdown of the labour share (LS) recorded in industrial countries from the early 1980s has 
spurred a resurgence of interest in the functional distribution of income and has led many 
economists to reconsider the role of factors such as globalization, total factor productivity growth, 
the Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) revolution, and capital deepening 
(OECD, 2012). In particular, since the early 1990s, technological progress and exposure to routine-
based occupations has explained about half of the overall decline in LS in advanced economies 
(IMF, 2017a). Only during the global crisis LS paused or slightly reversed, mainly because during 
recessions wages tend to be less volatile than profits. 
Furthermore, since the mid-1990s, as signaled by the IMF (2017a), in a number of European 
countries, the fall in LS is the result of the failure of wage growth to keep up with weak 
productivity growth. We suspect that in this new scenario, characterized by the waning of the ICT 
revolution, slower innovation, and slower human capital accumulation (IMF, 2017b, p. 5-6), the 
substantial liberalisation of labour markets recorded since the mid-1990s has played a role. We 
suggest that a higher utilisation of temporary contracts has not only discouraged investment in 
skills, with detrimental effects on labour productivity (European Commission, 2013, p.85), but has 
also lowered workers’ bargaining power, with a negative impact on LS.  
The liberalisation of labour markets has followed the key recommendations of the 1994 OECD Jobs 
Strategy, in particular in terms of new regulatory frameworks to liberalise the utilisation of 
temporary contracts. As a result, extensive use of these contracts has been a distinctive 
characteristic of European labour markets, and temporary contracts are more common now than in 
the mid-1990s. However, these trends have also coincided with ‘subdued’ nominal wage growth 
and wage weakness (IMF, 2017c, p. 89). Furthermore, as shown by Blanchard and Landier (2002) 
and Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), labour market reforms that increase flexibility ‘at the margin’, 
reducing legal restrictions on temporary contracts and leaving untouched the legislation applying to 
open-ended contracts, have not produced lasting effects on employment.  Indeed, the gains in terms 
of additional temporary jobs only compensate for the loss of permanent employment. This appears 
to be a relevant factor, but previous literature on LS has only analysed the role of overall 
employment protection legislation (Checchi and Garcia-Peñalosa, 2008; 2010; OECD, 2012), 
without considering separately regulation of temporary forms of employment.i  
The main aim of this paper is to fill that gap. We hypothesize that this liberalisation, which in 
some countries has increased the diffusion of precarious jobs, has weakened workers’ bargaining 
power without inducing offsetting effects through the channel of increased job opportunities. Thus, 
this liberalisation has failed to reverse the long-run trend where “labour is losing to capital” 
(OECD, 2012) and has instead exerted a negative impact, independent of that exerted by non-
labour-augmenting technical progress. Today, these issues are extremely important for EU countries 
because welfare-enhancing policy packages that counteract the declining trend of LS may be 
relevant in wage-led demand regimes, typically represented by the euro area, where these political 
reforms could sustain demand and a return to sustainable growth. 
We use industry-level data for a sample of 9 sectors of the market economy in 12 EU countries 
for the period 1996 to 2013, to verify whether relaxation of employment protection legislation of 
temporary employment (EPLT) has influenced the functional distribution of income.  
After providing summary statistics and preliminary descriptive investigations, first we apply a 
difference-in-difference econometric method to verify whether reform of temporary contracts in 
labour legislation has had a negative effect on LS, especially in industries with a higher propensity 
to employ temporary workers. We analyse this relationship separately for the extended period of 
1996–2013 and the sub-period preceding the outbreak of the economic crisis (1996–2007) in order 
to identify effects caused by the global recession shocks. The results of our research show that these 
liberalisations have had a negative influence which is additional to that of the non-labour-
augmenting technological process, which also negatively affected LS. This negative influence has 
been exerted under general conditions in which the power relationship between unions and 
employers has altered and unions have reduced their wage demands, thus contributing to the decline 
of LS.  
 Secondly, using fixed effects, generalized methods of moments (GMM), and error-correction 
approaches, we explore long-term impacts and how the adoption of temporary contracts has 
influenced labour share in the short and longer run between 1996 and 2013. 
 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature on functional 
income distribution and discusses the conceptual framework behind our empirical strategy. Section 
3 discusses the econometric strategy, while section 4 presents data, some descriptive statistics, and 
estimates. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background discussion 
2.1 The determinants of labour share: a brief review of the literature  
The decline in LS, observed from the early 1980s onwards in nearly all OECD countries, has led to 
a resurgence of interest in the analysis of factor share dynamics and also international organisations 
have tried to identify the main factors behind movements in LS (IMF, 2007 and 2017a; European 
Commission, 2007; BIS, 2006; ILO, 2013). 
Globalisation has been identified as a main driving force behind this decline, measured by 
different openness indicators (Harrison, 2002; Jayadev, 2007), under the general belief that 
immigration flows and offshoring in emerging economies with lower labour costs have exerted 
downward pressure on European and US labour shares (IMF, 2007; Elsby et al., 2013). In addition, 
it has been shown that due to the progressive elimination of cross-border restrictions on trade, 
import competition has contributed to containing wage demands (OECD, 2012). However, the 
empirical evidence so far has not been conclusive, and this area of research has not been able to 
fully reproduce LS dynamics. For instance, Guerriero and Sen (2012) find a positive effect of 
international trade on LS, and there is no evidence that wages are related to imports from emerging 
economies. In addition, sectors not exposed to import shocks (such as non-traded sectors) have also 
recorded a reduction in LS, as argued by Autor et al. (2017). 
Technological change is another driving force that has been considered. Starting from the early 
1980s, technological change, as capital-augmenting and capital-deepening, has contributed to the 
decline in LS, as shown by Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003) and later confirmed by Bassanini and 
Manfredi (2012). In particular, ICT have replaced workers involved in routine tasks, and these 
substitution effects, which have accompanied skill-biased technical changes, have penalised the 
position of low-educated workers (Arpaia et al., 2009; European Commission, 2007). Behind these 
changes, as signaled by Karabarbounis and Nieman (2014), there are also decreases in the relative 
price of investment goods, likely due to the fast decline of equipment prices of ICT technologies 
that have induced firms to shift away from labour and toward capital. 
However, the role of relative capital price reduction in the decline of LS only obtains when the 
capital–labour elasticity of substitution is greater than unity, whereas empirical literature suggests 
much lower values and does not confirm that capital and labour are gross substitutes, as surveyed 
by Chirinko (2008) and Lawrence (2015). In addition, Autor et al. (2017) emphasize the crucial role 
of the interaction of technology and market conditions, showing that only market concentration and 
reallocation in ‘superstar’ firms that command a growing market share and show declining LS may 
explain the aggregate effects of the reduction in the price of capital goods.  
As for automation, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016), highlight that it tends to reduce employment 
and the share of labour in national income. However, the creation of a more complex version of 
existing tasks, especially those labour-intensive where labour tends to have a comparative 
advantage, may have the opposite effect on LS. Interestingly, recent research (Barkai, 2016) also 
addresses the role of concentration and increasing mark-ups to explain the contemporaneous decline 
in both labour and capital shares caused by a larger amount of output being distributed as profit.  
In a third line of research, deterioration of labour power is represented as an additional important 
driver of LS. Checchi and Garcia Peñalosa (2010) investigate this relationship for 16 OECD 
countries between 1960 and 2000 and find no robust evidence for union density, minimum wage, 
and unemployment benefits having a positive influence on LS; the only exception being 
coordination bargaining, which boosts income accruing to labour. They also find that EPL tends to 
lower the wage pressure exerted by unions, but they do not explore the role of EPLT or the 
potentially different impact of institutions across industries. This is probably because they are 
analysing a period in which the rise of flexible labour arrangements was still a marginal 
phenomenon. Other authors emphasize that the striking technological changes affecting ICT-related 
goods have also improved the quality of monitoring worker effort (Bental and Demougin, 2010) 
and reduced the endogenous bargaining power of (unskilled) labour. Capital-embodied 
technological acceleration has lowered firms’ incentives to create new unskilled jobs and reduced 
the LS, while the presence of labour market regulation has amplified these effects, thus leading to a 
‘technology–policy interaction’ (Hornstein et al., 2007). Furthermore, recent work by the OECD 
(2012), which supports the thesis of technical progress as one of the most important determinants of 
factor shares, recognizes the influence of the increasing diffusion of temporary contracts on LS. The 
adoption of these contracts modifies “the nature of employment relations in a way that makes it 
more difficult for trade unions to recruit members” (OECD 2012, p.135) and represents a structural 
factor that drives the evolution of collective bargaining and contributes to explaining LS trends. 
Surprisingly, when the same OECD report analyses the quantitative impact of determinants of LS 
between 1990 and 2007, it only considers employment protection for regular workers and does not 
take into account temporary jobs and the policies that regulate them. By contrast, we think that 
these factors cannot be overlooked in European economies, where the main change observed in the 
last decades is the progressive decline in trade union power and the parallel reduction of 
employment protection legislation for temporary jobs. We will consider this in the rest of the paper. 
 
2.2 Conceptual framework of the empirical analysis 
To analyse potential determinants of LS, we rely on the model proposed by Bentolila and Saint 
Paul (2003) and then we add our own working hypotheses concerning the role played by temporary 
workers. By definition, labour share (LSi) on value added of industry i is LSi=WiLi/PiYi, where Wi is 
the wage rate paid to labour input Li , Yi is value added, and Pi is its price. The authors show that 
under constant returns to scale, labour-augmenting technical progress Yi = F(Ki, BiLi), and 
competitive markets, there is a one-to-one relationship between LSi and the capital-output ratio (ki,= 
Ki/Yi ), the so-called SK schedule LSi= g(ki).     
Thus, there exists a unique function g to explain LSi based on observable capital–output ratios, 
which in turn depend on factor prices and labour-augmenting technical progress B. This implies that 
variations of LSi across sectors and countries may be due to different values of the capital–output 
ratios and different elasticities of substitution between factors. A positive slope of the SK schedule 
means that the elasticity of substitution between factors (𝜎) is lower than one (factor 
complementarity); vice-versa, for |𝜎| ≥ 1, firms substitute capital for labour and the SK curve in 
the (k, LS) plane is downward-slopingii.  
Three types of variables are responsible for shifts of and movements off the g () function.  
First, the SK schedule is stable only if the pattern of technical progress is labour-augmenting. 
Conversely, for capital-augmenting technical progress, Yi = F(AiKi, BiLi), changes in Ai shifts the 
SK curve. In the particular case of the CES function LS is given by 𝐿𝑆𝑖 = 1 − 𝑎(𝐴𝑖𝑘𝑖)
𝛾.   
Notice that LSi is still monotonic in ki,, but technical changes of Ai reinforce the effects of capital 
intensity ki,  and Ai and ki have effects on LSi of the same sign. A different case is attained if 
technical change is neither labour- nor capital-augmenting, as obtainable from production function 
Yi = Ki f(li, Ai), where (li,= BiLi/Ki). This implies that LSi may be positively affected by ki, (factor 
complementarity) but negatively affected by Ai; for instance, technological progress may reduce the 
marginal product of labour, i.e., Ai is ‘labour-harming’, as Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003) find 
empirically for some industries.  
Second, movement off the g () function are also conceivable. In environments featuring product and 
labour market imperfections, there is a wedge between the real wage rate and productivity and all 
institutional variables that influence this wedge cause changes of LSi and departures from the SK 
curve. Under imperfect competition in the product market, profit-maximising firms charge their 
price as a mark-up on the marginal cost of labour, and thus LSi is conditioned by firms’ market 
power. A rise in the mark-up exerts downward pressure on LSi and counter-cyclical variation in the 
price mark-up causes pro-cyclical shifts in the LS, as documented by Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1999). Very often in empirical analyses the importance of mark-up is signalled by product market 
regulation (PMR), the idea being that a reduction in its strictness causes erosion of monopolistic 
positions and a consequent increase in LS. Note that lifting entry barriers, consistent with the 
hypothesis of markets with homogenous firms and workers (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003), should 
cause higher firm competition, a rise in labour demand, and an upwards shift of the SK schedule. 
However, so far there is evidence that lower entry barriers result in the entrance of firms whose 
workers frequently have lower bargaining power than the workers in the incumbent firms, thus 
causing a reduction in LSi, as empirically found by Böckerman and Maliranta (2012). In addition, if 
liberalisation is combined with privatisation, as observed in the case of state-owned enterprises in 
network industries (Azmat et al., 2012), there may be a shift in bargaining power away from 
workers (OECD, 2012), likely due to a change in the managerial objective function to being more 
focused on profits than employment targets. As a result, privatisation, inducing labour–demand 
curve shifts inward, determines smaller wage shares. 
A second source of departures from the SK curve is due to collective bargaining. The bargaining 
practices of European countries are either ‘right to manage’ or ‘efficient bargaining’ regimes 
(Layard et al., 2005; European Commission, 2007). Under the first regime, firms and unions 
bargain over wages and then firms set employment unilaterally, taking wages as given. Under this 
regime, labour demand, obtained from the profit maximization condition, requires equality between 
the marginal product (or the marginal revenue of labour) and the real wage. This means that wage 
pushes cause changes in the capital output ratio and movement along the SK curve, rather than 
away from it. 
Conversely, in the efficient bargaining model unions cause departures from the SK schedule where 
they negotiate with firms over both wages and employment. In such cases the wage rate differs 
from the marginal product of labour and unions drive a wedge between these two variables. In this 
contracting process, wages and employment, obtained as solutions of a Nash bargaining game, are 
given by the contract curve; i.e., the loci of points where unions’ indifference curves and firms’ 
isoprofit curves are tangent, and the relationship between LS and the capital-output ratio is off the 
SK schedule. The contract curve is upward-sloping and starts from the intersection of the labour 
demand curve and the reservation wage. A rise in the reservation wage implies that everywhere the 
new contract curve lies above the old one (Mc Donald and Solow, 1984). A rise in union bargaining 
power raises both the real wage and employment, and thus LSi.  
mpirically we expect that density of workers organizations, legal extension mechanisms of 
contracts (bargaining coverage), and unemployment benefits are the main indicators among the web 
of rules that concur to define the whole bargaining setting and influence workers’ bargaining 
power  and the reservation wage. 
Concerning employment protection legislation, so far the literature on LS has mainly looked into 
the effects of protection of permanent workers. Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003) have argued that 
this protection enhances labour adjustment costs (due to hiring and firing) and that increases in 
these costs boost the wedge between the real wage and productivity, thus reducing LS. 
We also hypothesize that employment protection legislation of temporary contracts (EPLT) 
plays a role in affecting workers’ bargaining power. First of all, there is evidence that “some unions 
are more concerned about longer serving members, and agree to contracts with steep returns to 
seniority” (Booth et al., 2002). This implies that the Nash bargaining model is conceivable for 
permanent workers but is not applicable to temporary workers, who are “an extreme case of 
outsiders, who receive a low wage compared to permanent workers” (Booth et al., 2002). Indeed, 
“Temporary workers are much less likely to be union members than those on open-ended contracts, 
because their organisation and representation in collective bargaining remain very difficult” (OECD 
2012, p.135). In this context, bargaining only takes place between permanent workers and firms, 
whereas temporary workers have no bargaining power and only obtain a reservation wage. Thus, 
for lower values of EPLT (and an increase in the number of temporary workers), the value of the 
average aggregate bargaining power of workers declines, and thus also LS declines.  
In addition, literature on employment protection legislation has shown that the steady state 
effects of reforms that introduce marginal flexibility, such as liberalisation of temporary contracts, 
may be perverse because they induce high turnover in fixed-duration jobs, leading to higher, not 
lower, unemployment (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). Eventually, employment dynamics also 
reveal that these institutional reforms exert only a transitional ‘honeymoon effect’ on job creation 
(Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). Indeed, employment increases reveal no lasting effect because the 
stock of insiders hired on permanent contracts is phased out by natural turnover. Then, fixed-term 
employees replace open-ended contracts, and firms gradually adjust the stock of permanent workers 
downwards. In the long run, average employment in the rigid regime equals that in the flexible 
regime, the only difference being that the latter is more volatile and the composition of 
temporary/regular workers changes (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). We also expect that if temporary 
workers are paid less than permanent workers, i.e., at their reservation wage as discussed above, a 
second channel emerges through which the liberalisation of temporary jobs affects LS. A wage 
reduction in fact causes movements along the SK schedule and changes in LS depending on the 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. Strong substitutability between labour and 
capital (|𝜎| ≥ 1) leads the wage reduction to positively affect LS because lower compensation is 
largely offset by an increase in employment (labour replaces capital), being the output constant. By 
contrast, complementarity between labour and capital (|𝜎| < 1) causes a wage reduction to depress 
the labour share, due to the very weak increase in employment (labour is a complement of capital). 
To summarise the discussion above, we augment in qualitative terms the model formulated by 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) with our own working hypotheses, which relies on the Boeri and 
Garibaldi model (2007) that focuses on liberalisation of temporary jobs in two-tier regimes, and on 
the hypotheses of different wage settings for permanent and temporary workers. Therefore, we 
estimate a sector–country SK schedule and expect that liberalisation of temporary jobs (easing of 
EPLT) contributes to labour share movements through two channels. The first one influences the 
movements off the SK schedule because it weakens unions’ bargaining power this means that the 
higher the share of temporary workers, the lower the cohort of regular workers to whom efficient 
bargaining applies. The second channel involves a reduction in the wages of temporary workers that 
necessarily induces movements along the SK schedule and changes in LS, depending on the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour.  
As in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), we control for other factors causing shifts, such as non-
labour-augmenting technological progress, and movements off the SK schedule, such as the 
stringency of protection for regular workers, union density, bargaining coverage, unemployment 
benefits, and product market regulation.  
 
3. Estimation strategy 
We verify the hypotheses discussed above by firstly estimating the impact on LS of country-level 
employment protection legislation for temporary workers (EPLT) and other controls. According to 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), we start from a general multiplicative form representing an 
augmented SK schedule: 
𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑔(𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) ℎ(𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (1) 
where j=1, …9 industries; i=1,…12 countries; t=1996, …2013 years; LS is the labour share, and g 
includes well known elements of the SK schedule, that is, the capital–output ratio (k) and capital-
augmenting technological progress (A); X contains sector–country-level control variables, and LMI 
represents the country-level labour market institutions.  
Following the literature inaugurated by Rajan and Zingales (1998) in financial economics and 
applied to labour analysis by Haltiwanger et al. (2008), Bassanini et al. (2009), and Cingano et al. 
(2010), we adopt a difference-in-difference method to study the influence of country-level 
institutions on sector–country-level LS. This method maintains a country perspective but also takes 
into account the remarkable cross-sector technological differences. In other words, we estimate the 
impact of the degree of EPLT stringency on cross-industry LS differences, considering whether the 
impact is greater in industries in which, in the absence of regulation, the propensity to employ 
temporary workers is higher. Analogously, we control for the role of employment protection of 
regular workers (EPLR), assuming that the effect of liberalisation of regular jobs is more important 
in industries where the intrinsic, natural net turnover rate (or job reallocation rate) is higher. 
We take logs of equation (1) and make explicit terms in the g and h functions, thus obtaining the 
following specification: 
 
ln (𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln (𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝛽2ln (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝛽3ln (TWS_Bench𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽4ln (TOBench𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) +
𝛽5ln (TOBench𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝑡ℎ. 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽6ln (𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7ln (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡    (2) 
 
where ki and TFP are capital–output ratio and total factor productivity, respectively; EPLT and 
EPLR are employment protection legislation indicators for temporary and regular workers, 
Oth.LMIs includes other labour market institutions: union density (UD), bargaining coverage rate 
(BC), and unemployment benefits (UB); PMR is an indicator for sector–country-level product 
market regulation; EMPE is the percentage of employees in total employment, which is a necessary 
control when the outcome variable is the labour share not adjusted by self-employment income; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝐷𝑗 are country-by-time dummies and sector dummies respectively, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 are the 
idiosyncratic shocks. It is worth noting that we cannot use sector–country fixed effects in this 
specification (as in the case of panel data) because that method would eliminate all the industry-by-
country variation, making the identification of the effect of interest (𝛽3, 𝛽4, and 𝛽5 coefficients) rely 
only on the (limited) time variation of the institutional variables. In addition, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐷𝑗 are 
supposed to capture all country-by-time (business cycles and other institutional effects) and sectoral 
confounding factors; since these dummies control for any country and sectoral variance, the main 
effect of EPL and sectoral benchmarks is absorbed (Bassanini et al., 2009). iii  All variables 
describing labour market institutions are lagged one year, as they take time to exert effects and enter 
as interaction terms because they are multiplied by sectoral benchmarks. In the case of EPLT, the 
sectoral benchmark is an intrinsic (frictionless) propensity to employ temporary workers 
(TWS_Bench), whereas for EPLR and Oth.LMIs the sectoral benchmark is an intrinsic (frictionless) 
job turnover rate (TO_Bench).iv  
The coefficient 𝛽3 tells us that changes (difference) in the difference in LS between any two 
industries in any country at any point in time can be expressed as a function of EPLT, whose effect 
is greater the greater the difference in the two industries’ intrinsic propensity to employ temporary 
workers. Similarly, the 𝛽4 and 𝛽5 coefficients capture the effects of EPLR and Oth.LMIs (union 
density, bargaining coverage, and unemployment benefits) on the difference in LS between 
industries within a given country, and these effects will be greater the greater the difference in 
industries’ intrinsic job turnover rate. This intrinsic job turnover rate describes the within-sector job 
reallocation, and in the specific case of EPLR it proxies the adjustment costs used by Bentolila and 
Saint-Paul (2003).v To sum up, the basic idea is that the impact of labour market institutions will be 
more binding in sectors showing a higher intensity of the phenomenon they regulate.  
Normally, in the difference-in-difference specification, the sectoral benchmark represents a 
frictionless job turnover rate (in our case, also a frictionless propensity to employ temporary 
workers) and is derived from the most flexible market economy available; i.e., US or UK 
(Haltiwanger et al., 2008; Bassanini et al., 2009). Some authors convincingly raised criticisms 
because within-sector heterogeneity across countries undermines the validity and representativeness 
of the choice of the benchmark country for the other countries included in the sample (Cingano et 
al. 2010, p.130 and footnote 4). Others, such as Ciccone and Papaioannou (2016), have shown that 
the presence of idiosyncratic shocks in the benchmark country causes noticeable measurement 
errors that induce biases in the coefficients of interest (in our case, 𝛽3, 𝛽4 and 𝛽5) For this reason, 
following Cingano et al. (2010) and Ciccone and Papaioannou (2016), we calculated an average 
benchmark measure, not reflecting idiosyncratic factors specific to a country and based on the 
following estimates: 
𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾(𝐷𝑗 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝐷𝑗 + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (3) 
𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾(𝐷𝑗 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝐷𝑗 + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   (4) 
where i, j, and t are the  same countries, industries, and time period already reported in equations (1) 
and (2); TWS and TO are sector–country measures of the actual share of temporary workers 
(propensity to employ temporary workers) and actual job turnover rate (job reallocation); the 
interaction term 𝛾(𝐷𝑗 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡−1) accounts for the marginal effect of overall employment 
protection legislationvi on TWS and TO in each industry j, and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 accounts for country-by-time 
dummies. The variables of interest in equations (3) and (4) are the sectoral fixed effects 𝐷?̂?, which 
capture the extent of the industry propensity to employ temporary workers, or industry job 
reallocation in a country not subject to firing and hiring restrictions. In other words, 𝐷?̂? represent our 
intrinsic (frictionless) 𝑇𝑊𝑆_𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑗  and 𝑇𝑂_𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑗  in Equation (2), assumed to be exogenous 
because they have been purged from the effects of protection legislation. 
As for 𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, the dependent variable of Equation (4), we follow Cingano et al., (2010) and 
Davies and Haltiwanger (1990) and calculate a job turnover measure that proxies the sector–
country-level job reallocation: 
𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 2
|𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡− 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1|
𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
 (5) 
where e are employees and i, j, and t, countries, sector and time, respectively. 
Equation (2) is estimated by OLS with boostrapped standard errors in order to correct potential 
sampling errors deriving from using regressors estimated in the first stage (𝑇𝑊𝑆_𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑗  and 
𝑇𝑂_𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑗  from equations (3) and (4)). 
A number of econometric concerns affect equation (2). Bassanini and Manfredi (2012) highlight 
the strong endogeneity of both k and TFP.vii Another critical concern is the omission of sector–
country fixed effects, which has been done to preserve the cross-sector variability of the impact of 
institutions on LS. For these reasons, the drivers of LS are very often analysed within a dynamic 
framework in which difference equations and GMM estimators help to deal with endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity issues (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; Bassanini and Manfredi, 2012). 
Introducing institutional indicators with limited year-by-year variability in such dynamic 
framework makes little sense in econometric terms. Indeed, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) use a 
sector-country-time varying variable such as the net growth rate of the number of employees to 
approximate the labour adjustment costs, which in turn reflects the influence of firing and hiring 
restrictions. 
In our case, as previously discussed, the variables that somehow capture the enforcement of 
EPLT and EPLR are the actual share of sector–country temporary workers (𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and the actual 
job turnover rate (𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), both with a good year-by-year variability. By regressing LS on TWS and 
TO we are able to study the direct impact of changes in the propensity to employ temporary 
workers and the propensity for job reallocation; hence we perform a robustness check on results 
obtained from equation (2).  
More formally, in the second step of the empirical analysis we estimate the following equations: 
ln (𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln (𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝛽2ln (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝛽4 ln(𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) +
𝛽5ln (𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝛽6 ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡        (6) 
  
Δln (𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) = 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1Δln (𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) +  𝛽2Δln (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝛽3Δln(𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝛽4 Δln(𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) +
𝛽5Δln (𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝛽6Δ ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝛽7ln (𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝛽8ln (𝐾𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) +  𝛽9ln (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) +
𝛽10ln(𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝛽11 ln(𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝛽12ln (𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝛽13 ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (7) 
 
where all variables are sector-country-time varying and have the same meaning as discussed 
above.viii Equation 6 is estimated using standard fixed effects estimator and GMM-SYS. The former 
method only deals with unobserved heterogeneity across sector-countries, while the second one 
allows us to also take into account endogeneity. 
Equation (7) shows a dynamic structure and allows us to investigate potential long-run effects of 
the variables of interest (TWS and TO). Since the time span in our sample is rather limited, 18 years, 
an autoregressive distributed lag process (ARDL) should be applied with caution, and thus we 
consider this analysis as a supplementary robustness check of previous estimates.ix In any case, a 
dynamic specification is coherent with our conceptual framework and the prediction of long-run 
effects of labour reforms discussed in section 2, according to which a negative impact of TWS on 
LS might emerge. 
To test this conjecture, we applied an ARDL (1,1) with an error-correction transformation and 
estimated Equation (7) by means of the dynamic fixed-effect estimator (DFE) and common 
correlated mean group estimator (CCE), the latter developed by Pesaran (2006). Both estimators 
allow us to calculate the speed of adjustment of LS in the long run, the 𝛽7 coefficient of equation 
(11), and the long-run coefficients of TWS (−
𝛽10
𝛽7
) and TO (−
𝛽11
𝛽7
). However, DFE restricts both 
short-run (from 𝛽1 𝑡𝑜 𝛽6) and long-run coefficients to be equal across all panels, while CCE deals 
with cross-sectional dependence and time-variant unobservables that have heterogeneous impacts 
across panels. We follow Stock and Watson (2002) and Chudik and Pesaran (2015) to combine the 
ARDL model with CCE. In other words, CCE takes into account both time-invariant and time-
variant heterogeneity across panels, for example, time-variant unobservable common factors 
between the error terms and covariates that cause endogeneity. In our case, it is plausible to 
conjecture that potential dependence across sectors within the same country is driven by all 
institutional factors that are omitted in this specification. As we show (see Table A.5), the Pesaran 
cross-sectional dependence (CD) test does not reject this assumption. 
 
4. Data, descriptive statistics, and estimation results 
4.1 Data sources and variables used in the empirical analysis 
Our empirical investigation relies on several databases: 1) EU KLEMS (September 2017 release) 
for the labour share (LS), the capital-output ratio, and the total factor productivity index (TFP); 2) 
OECD indexes for employment protection and product market regulation; 3) ICTWSS database 
(Visser, 2016) for measures of union density and bargaining coverage;  4) EUROSTAT for series of 
employment and unemployment benefits (see Appendix, Table A1). 
Our dependent variable is the labour share that measures the fraction of sector–country value 
added accruing to labour. This measure underestimates labour share because it excludes income 
generated from self-employment, which is mixed income (from property and labour), and whose 
attribution to either labour or capital is questionable. We also prefer performing our estimates using 
unadjusted labour shares (i.e., without self-employment) to prevent confounding effects, since 
employment protection legislation covers only employees. In any case, we offer in both descriptive 
statistics and econometric analysis a comparison for adjusted (including self-employment labour 
income) and unadjusted labour shares to evaluate the relative importance of self-employment in 
different countries and to perform robustness checks. We also use the ratio of employees to total 
employment (EUROSTAT data) as a control for estimates of the unadjusted labour share. 
 Following Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), we define capital–output as the ratio of nominal 
capital stock on nominal value added in national currency and use TFP as an index (2010=100).x 
As for our key OECD indicators, EPLT describes the conditions under which workers can be hired 
on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts. These conditions usually concern the type of job 
and activity in which these contracts are allowed, their maximum duration, and the conditions for 
their renewal or termination. EPLR defines the rules under which individual dismissals are possible 
(provisions for notice periods, involvement of third parties such as courts and works councils, 
specification of severance payments). ELPT and EPLR indicators range from 0 to 6, with higher 
scores representing stricter regulation (OECD, 2013). PMR is a regulatory impact indicator that 
defines the potential costs of anticompetitive regulation in network industries (gas, electricity, and 
water supply, transport, and communications) in all sectors of the economy that use the output of 
the sectors above as intermediate inputs in their production process. It is a sector–country–time-
varying variable with scale normalized to 0–1, from least to most restrictive (Égert and Wanner, 
2016). The source and meaning of the remaining control variables are reported in the Appendix 
(Table A.1). 
Data limitations concerning both the appropriateness of the LS measure in certain sectors (we 
excluded public administration and personal and social services) and the availability of an updated 
breakdown of sectors for TFP, capital–output ratio, and temporary workers led us to select 12 EU 
countries,xi 9 sectors of the market economy, xii and the period from 1996 to 2013. We obtain an 
unbalanced panel of 108 groups and 1,854 observations, at most.  
 
4.2 Summary statistics and preliminary investigation 
In the advanced economies, the share of labour income began to fall in the 1980s, and has not 
recovered substantially since. However, the decline in the labour share slowed down from 1996 
onward, as evidenced by previous studies (from 1970 to 2005, Arpaia, 2009; from 1970 to 2009, 
Bassanini and Manfredi, 2012). This trend is reflected in our summary statistics, which also add 
information for the years of the great global crisis and the subsequent sluggish recovery. In order to 
appreciate the main differences between before and during the crisis, we split our sample period 
into two sub-periods, 1996–2007 and 2007–2013. Some relevant points emerge, as shown in Table 
1 and Table A.2: 
• in most countries LS presents a sluggish or declining trend over the period 1996–2007 and a 
slight increase in the years 2007–2013; 
• almost all the countries that experienced LS decline between 1996 and 2007 also recorded a 
sizable increase in the share of temporary workers; in addition, the slight increase in LS in the 
following years was associated with a lower adoption of temporary contracts and a slight slowdown 
of TFP; 
• the change in the weight of various sectors only partly explains labour share movements, 
whereas changes in the labour share within sectors play a dominant role; 
• significant easing of EPLT was recorded in half of the twelve countries, whereas EPLR was 
largely stable. In the majority of countries, legal protection of temporary workers was less stringent 
than that offered to regular workers (Belgium, France, and Spain are exceptions). 
More detailed information from cross-country and cross-sector comparisons is available in 
Figure 1 and Tables 1 and A.2. 
First, from the aggregate values of the twelve countries in our sample (last row of Table 1), we 
observe that both the unadjusted and the adjusted labour share slightly declined between 1996 and 
2007 (from 46.06% to 44.87% and from 61.79% to 59.45% respectively). In particular, 7 out of 12 
countries experienced a LS decline over the 1996–2007 period, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (see also Figure 1). 
Second, all the countries experiencing a LS decline between 1996 and 2007, with the exception 
of Finland, show a sizeable increase in the share of temporary workers.xiii Two cases in point are 
Germany and the Netherlands. The first recorded a contraction in LS of nearly 10 percentage points 
and a 4 percentage points increase in the share of temporary workers. The second saw a LS 
reduction of almost 5 percentage points and an increase in the share of temporary workers of more 
than 8 percentage points.  
Third, between 2007 and 2013 the unadjusted LS marginally regained ground (reaching the 
value of 46.94%). This confirms, as found by the OECD (2015, p. 4), that the longer-term 
downward trend of LS paused or slightly reversed with the global crisis, mainly because during 
recessions wages tend to be less volatile than profits and because of the protective role of labour 
market institutions.xiv However, the adjusted LS did not resume its 1996 level and both the 
propensity to hire temporary workers and the TFP index slowed down or came to a halt, 
corresponding to a slight increase in LS observed in most of the countries.  
Cross-sectoral differences are also important. Table A.2 shows that both unadjusted and adjusted 
labour share were above the sample average in manufacturing, construction, trade, hotels and 
restaurants, transport and communications. With the exception of agriculture and mining, the 
within-sector variability of LS described by the coefficient of variation (Cv) is lower than the 
within-country variability (Table 1). This finding suggests that sector-specific characteristics are 
relevant and justify the sector-country approach of our empirical analysis.  
The ample differentials by sector lead us to verify if the changes in the unadjusted labour share 
reflect the growing importance of sectors with a very low fraction of income accruing to labour. 
Figure 5 charts the results from a standard shift and share analysis (see Lawrence 2015). We 
observe that changes in the sectoral composition have had a negative but very marginal impact on 
the overall LS variation, compared to the large within-industry changes. The negative within-
industry changes in LS that we observe between 1996 and 2007 for countries such as France, 
Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Sweden could have been driven by non-
labour-augmenting technological progress proxied by TFP, as suggested in other studies (OECD 
2012; Bassanini and Manfredi, 2012). However, we cannot ignore that some of these countries, 
especially Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Austria, also experienced an increase in the 
percentage of temporary workers over the same period. In addition, notice that temporary workers’ 
gross hourly wages always remained much lower than those of regular workers in all countries and 
all sectors, as shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.xv Thus, shifts in the composition of 
employment (higher values of TWS) may have exerted downward pressure on average wages, 
contributing to explaining the “slow growth of nominal wages, which reinforces a longer trend of 
stagnant median wages” (IMF 2017c, p.xiii).  This evidence encourages us to consider the extensive 
use of temporary employment as a potential driver of LS movements.  
As shown in Table A.2, the observed temporary workers share (TWS) differs remarkably across 
sectors, and increased in 8 of the 12 countries (see Table 1). With the crisis the TWS slightly 
reduced in 6 countries. Table A.2 also shows the values of TWS_bench_1996–2013, which were 
estimated in Equation (3) as sectoral fixed effects and reflect the value of the frictionless use of 
temporary workers. As expected, they are much lower than the observed values of the TWS. Notice 
also that this frictionless, natural propensity to employ temporary workers differs across sectors and 
is higher in agriculture, mining, electricity and gas, construction, and hotels and restaurants. In all 
these sectors the impact of protection legislation for temporary workers (EPLT) is expected to be 
more binding than elsewhere. A similar reasoning holds for frictionless job reallocation 
(TO_bench_1996–2013). 
As for the dynamics of EPLR and EPLT, Figure 6 charts that the former varies very little over 
time, whereas more variability is observed for EPLT. This means that low and high EPLR countries 
(for instance, the UK for the first group and the Netherlands and Italy for the second) have kept 
statutory protection of regular jobs almost unchanged. By contrast, greater relaxation of temporary 
contract rules has been important in Germany (-2, see also Table A.4), where it was accompanied 
by a marked slowdown of LS, from 63.92% in 1996 to 54.93% in 2013, as shown in Table 1. In 
other countries, such as Sweden and the Netherlands (which also saw reductions in EPLT, of –0.33 
and –0.44 respectively, see Table A.4), the softening of rules for temporary workers was 
accompanied by sizeable reductions in LS between 1996 and 2007. Also, notice that in Figure 6, for 
9 out of 12 countries and almost all years, the strictness of EPLT is lower than that of EPLR, the 
exceptions being France, Belgium, and Spain.xvi In any case, our analysis concentrates on the 
heterogeneous impact of EPLT across sectors. For instance, Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows that 
if the relaxation of EPLT is equal within a country, the share of temporary contracts grows more in 
sectors with a higher natural propensity to employ flexible labour (construction) compared to 
sectors with a lower propensity (manufacturing). This especially holds for countries with 
remarkable asymmetries in protection levels (that is, high EPLR and low EPLT) such as Germany 
and the Netherlands, which also experienced a remarkable decline in sectoral labour share (see 
Figure A.2). 
Employment protection legislation is not the only institutional determinant of labour share 
movements. Between 1996 and 2013, as reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix, union density, 
bargaining coverage, and product market regulation noticeably weakened in most of the countries. 
In particular, the union membership rate fell from 44.92% in 1996 to 33.29% in 2013. As expected, 
with the crisis the average amount of unemployment benefit necessarily increased (on average 
+3.3%). All these possible confounding factors have been taken into account in the following 
econometric analysis. 
4.3 Main results of econometric analysis  
To test the robustness of results before and during shocks caused by the great recession, we first 
regress the unadjusted labour share as specified in equation (2) for the period 1996–2007. Table 2 
lists the results. The first column reports estimates of a baseline specification in which EPLT is 
interacted with the intrinsic propensity to employ temporary workers (TWS_Bench) according to the 
difference-in-difference approach. The baseline specification also includes standard determinants of 
LS such as TFP, capital–output ratio, and EMPE, the ratio of employees to total employment (this 
ratio is a useful control when the dependent variable is the unadjusted labour share). In addition, we 
inserted dummies to capture specific factors at country-by-time and sector level. As mentioned in 
section 3, these dummies capture all variance at country and sector level; hence they replace the 
main effects of the interaction terms of interest. The results we obtain (column 1) tell us that the 
stringency of protection of temporary workers positively affects LS.  
This main finding is confirmed controlling for other variables; i.e., EPLR interacted with the 
intrinsic turnover rate of industries (TO_bench) (column 2), and adding product market regulation 
(PMR) (column 3). On the whole, these difference in difference estimates suggest that LS tends to 
be lower (or to move slowly) in industries with a greater propensity to use temporary contracts, the 
less stringent the level of EPLT. To provide a more detailed explanation, let us consider the 
coefficient ln(EPLT*TWS_bench) in column 3, which is 0.329%. This means that a 1% increase in 
the EPLT in a given country raises the difference in LS between two industries by 0.329% 
multiplied by the percentage difference in the natural propensity to employ temporary workers (that 
is, the TWS_bench value). For instance, let us examine the case of construction and manufacturing; 
i.e., two sectors with intrinsically high (4.33) and low (1.09) propensities to employ temporary 
workers, respectively (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). The natural propensity to employ temporary 
workers in construction is 297% larger than in manufacturing. Now let us take the case of the 
Netherlands: from Table A.4 we know that EPLT in this country in 1996 was 46% higher than in 
2007 (it fell from 1.38 to 0.94). Therefore, the overall impact of ln(EPLT*TWS_bench) on the 
construction–manufacturing labour share gap in the Netherlands between 1996 and 2007 was about 
45%, all other variables being constant.xvii The actual construction–manufacturing LS gap in the 
Netherlands changed from 22 percentage points in 1996 (77%–55%) to 10 percentage points in 
2007 (59%–49%); hence, it fell by 12 percentage points. Had the EPLT not fallen from 1.38 to 
0.94, the construction–manufacturing labour share gap would have reduced by only 6.6 percentage 
points, due to the positive influence of the higher EPLT stringency level. Put differently, the easing 
of EPLT in the Netherlands caused a reduction in the favourable LS position of construction as 
compared to manufacturing. 
The results in Table 2 also show that the impact of TFP is always negative and statistically 
significant, confirming the finding of other studies (OECD, 2012). For the capital–output ratio (k) 
we obtain a positive outcome, as found for some industries by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) and 
for the country-level analysis by Checchi and Garcia-Peñalosa (2010). A potential explanation is 
given by the prevalence of sectors where production function is characterized by capital–skill 
complementarity and an elasticity of substitution between capital and labour less than 1, as also 
documented for the most important EU countries by Berger and Wolff (2017). Interestingly, these 
technological characteristics are coherent with our key result for EPLT. If a weak EPLT allows the 
share of temporary workers to increase and these workers are paid less than regular workers (see 
Figure A.1), we have an average reduction in wages that negatively affects LS when the elasticity 
of substitution is less than 1 (Arrow 1961, p.244). In addition, the opposing roles of TFP (negative) 
and k (positive) are likely due to the fact that our TFP index does not capture the capital-
augmenting technological progress but simply a ‘labour-harming’ technological progress that 
reduces the marginal productivity of labour, as suggested by Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003).xviii 
We also find that a high degree of product market regulation has a positive effect on LS. Notice 
that the OECD indicator PMR also covers privatisation programmes, measured as a shift toward 
pro-competitive policies, whose likely effects are restructuring processes and staff reduction, as 
Azmat et al. (2012) find for the network industries. Our estimates may be the result of different 
deregulation programmes that include both privatisation process and increases in the degree of 
product market competition in private sectors, with likely differential effects on labour market 
outcomes.xix  
In additional specifications we introduce, alternatively, three variables that influence 
negotiations between workers and employees; i.e., union density (UD) (column 4), bargaining 
coverage (BC) (column 5), and unemployment benefits (UB) (column 6). As already discussed in 
section 3, similarly to EPLR, these variables are interacted with the intrinsic turnover rate of 
industries (TO_bench), the basic idea being that these institutions are more binding the higher the 
intrinsic propensity to reallocate jobs within industries. In these estimates (columns 4-6), EPLT and 
the other three labour market indicators are not statistically significant.  
These preliminary results at least partially suggest that reforms to liberalise the use of temporary 
workers and reduce EPLT may be perverse: when firms are allowed to hire workers on fixed-term 
contracts they pay lower wages because these workers are less represented by unions, and because 
there is more frequent need to recruit and hire new temporary workers with minimal training. Since 
these reforms do not have counterbalancing effects in terms of job creation, as also demonstrated by 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), they might play a negative role in LS.  
Additional estimates for the years 1996–2013 confirm the significant and positive role of EPLT, 
and the role of other proxies for trade union power is now positively signed and significant at the 
1% level (see Table 3). This means that for the sample period that covers the great recession there is 
clear evidence that EPLT positively affects LS and its impact is included within a narrow range, as 
clearly shown by the comparison of results in columns 1–6. The role of unionization, bargaining 
coverage, and unemployment benefits is also positive and significant, suggesting that all forms of 
employment protection have been effective in counteracting the LS decline. The dummy variable 
for the crisis shows a positive sign in almost all specifications but is not significant, likely because 
labour institutions already capture its influence on positive LS movements during this period. This 
is coherent with the preliminary evidence reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix, where we observe 
that contraction of labour compensation has been less intense than that of valued added in European 
countries with high degrees of workers’ protection. 
 
4.4 Robustness checks 
Our previous findings on the role of EPLT in LS have been validated by various robustness checks. 
First of all, we take into account concerns regarding the measurement of LS. Even though we 
explained that labour market institutions mainly affect dependent workers, we acknowledge that 
most empirical investigation use measures of LS adjusted for self-employment (OECD, 2012). 
Indeed, in our case also, relevant differences emerge when self-employment is included (Tables 1 
and A.2). For this reason, we replicate the estimates for the adjusted labour share and the obtained 
results confirm that more stringent EPLT is even more strongly positively associated with LS when 
we include self-employment (Table 4).xx Furthermore, the positive role of unionization, collective 
bargaining coverage, and unemployment benefits for the sample covering the great recession are 
confirmed by the total employment estimates (Table 5). 
Other robustness checks are performed, in more general terms, to take into account unobserved 
heterogeneity, endogeneity, and potential long-run effects of temporary employment on LS. As 
explained in section 3, we cannot combine panel data estimators and the difference-in-difference 
approach without washing away the variability of interest. In addition, it makes little sense to use 
the EPL indicators in dynamic specifications due to their limited year-by-year variability (see 
Figure 6). We thus perform estimates for the role of the share of temporary contracts (TWS), which 
shows much more time variability than EPLT. With this strategy we also directly test the role of 
actual adoption of these contracts, instead of the regulatory framework that governs their adoption. 
Analogously, instead of estimating the role of EPLR we directly insert job turnover rates (TO), 
which are affected by adjustments costs, i.e., those costs affected by hiring and firing norms 
captured by the EPLR indicator (Bentolila and Saint Pau, 2003; Cingano et al., 2010). 
Table 6 shows the results of equation (6), where fixed effects (FE) and GMM-SYS estimations 
are performed. Despite the different estimation methods and the presence of sector–country fixed 
effects, almost all control variables already used in the diff-in-diff specification show the expected 
signs.xxi This means that these new specifications are coherent with those in Tables 2–5. Our 
variable of interest (TWS) shows the expected sign but is not significantly different from zero in the 
FE specification (columns 1–3), which changes to be strongly significant with the expected sign 
once we control for its endogeneity and capital endogeneity in the GMM-SYS model (column 4).xxii 
Eventually, an increase in job turnover rate that captures adjustments costs negatively affects LS, 
conforming with the results of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), even though in our estimates the 
coefficient shows a weak significance and turns out to not be significant in the last estimations.xxiii  
As a final check, we distinguish between long-term dynamics and short-run effects by using an 
error correction model. The upper part of Table 7 shows the long-run relationships and the lower 
part the short-run dynamics. Note that two different sets of estimates are performed. The dynamic 
fixed-effect estimates (DFE) control for the presence of unobserved factors that may lead to 
spurious correlation, but restrict short-run and long-run coefficients to being equal across all panels. 
Conversely, the common correlation effects mean group estimator (CCE) also corrects for cross-
sectional dependence and time-variant heterogeneity across panels, which plausibly affect our 
estimates, as confirmed by Pesaran’s cross-sectional dependent test reported in the Appendix (see 
Table A.5). Indeed, as discussed in section 3, labour market reforms affect sectors in the same 
country differently depending on different sectoral propensities to employ temporary workers or to 
reallocate jobs. By omitting a specification that controls for this fact, we plausibly have time-variant 
unobservables with heterogeneous impacts across panel members that cause identification problems 
for the coefficient of interest. Therefore, CCE allows taking this problem into account in a dynamic 
panel data framework. 
In both models the error correction mechanism is lower than one and significant; hence it makes 
sense to explore long-run relationships. The DFE results show that a negative long-run relationship 
between LS and the share of temporary workers is obtained in the specification that also includes 
turnover rates (column 3). Analogously, with the CCE procedure a negative coefficient of 
temporary workers (of similar magnitude) is obtained in the full model (column 6).xxiv In no 
estimates significant results are obtained for turnover rates.  
To sum up, a negative impact of a higher share of temporary workers on LS emerges at least in 
some specifications in Tables 6 and 7. This finding also partially supports our conjecture, based on 
Boeri and Garibaldi’s model (2007), that in the long run the increasing liberalisation of temporary 
work does not positively affect employment levels. Consequently, if temporary workers’ rewards 
are systematically lower than those of regular workers, a higher share of temporary workers 
negatively and persistently affects LS in the long run. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The impact of labour market reforms that lower protection of temporary contracts has been 
documented in a number of works, but their effect on income distribution is still an open question. 
We have analysed this issue and our results may be summarized as follows. First, based on our 
descriptive statistics we suggest that the sluggish or declining movement of the labour share 
recorded in most countries between 1996 and 2007 is mainly due to moderation of labour 
compensation within sectors and, in addition to other determinants highlighted in the literature, is 
also associated with increased adoption of temporary contracts.  
Second, our estimates focussing on periods of different length (1996–2007 and 1996–2013) 
show that legislative innovations that favour the extensive use of temporary contracts negatively 
affect LS, likely because they lower employees’ average compensations. Conversely, legislative 
restrictions on adoption of temporary contracts enhance LS. This effect is even stronger than that 
reported for the 1996-2007 period, if we turn to the extended period that includes the great 
recession (1996–2013). Over this extended period, other labour market institutions also exert a 
positive impact on LS, thus underlining their role as ‘shelter of last resort’ in protecting labour 
income during periods of exceptional negative shocks. These findings are validated by controlling 
for the employment protection of regular workers, wage-setting characteristics, product market 
regulation, total factor productivity, and capital–output ratio. In addition, various robustness checks 
that also evaluate the direct impact (and the long-run influence) of the share of temporary workers 
on labour share corroborate the main results. 
Our interpretation is that liberalisation of temporary jobs has favoured the access of additional 
workers to the labour market, but has not had a permanent effect on job creation. Liberalisation of 
temporary jobs has been recorded in economies that are also characterised by a declining union 
presence and reduced wage demands. This means that the overall balance of employment and wage 
effects has been negative, as our estimates of the income share accruing to workers suggests. In a 
scenario of precarious working conditions, employees and their representatives have experienced a 
decline in bargaining power, leading them to moderate their demands and thus causing a reduction 
in LS.  
Previous results pointing out that labour market institutions exert a negligible influence on LS 
did not consider separately the role of temporary job protection, as we did. This was probably 
because their sample periods included years in which this form of employment was less frequently 
adopted. By contrast, from the mid-1990s flexible labour arrangements have gained momentum, 
and our evidence fills an important gap. Furthermore, previous research did not include the years 
after the outbreak of the global crisis, and by considering the period 1996–2013 it emerges that not 
only temporary workers’ protection but also other labour market institutions (protection for regular 
workers, union density, bargaining coverage, unemployment benefits) may play a positive role in 
LS. Thus, introducing a temporal interval that includes the economic shocks caused by the recent 
crisis is a second important factor contributing to our results, in contrast to the previous literature. 
Our conclusive considerations concern policy implications. In most advanced economies, 
redistribution of wealth from labour to property has occurred in the context of increasing income 
inequality.xxv Our work has shown that in a context of complementarity between capital and labour, 
likely driven by skill-biased technical changes, the progressive introduction of a low-cost labour 
force has negatively affected the labour share. Thus, we suggest that labour market reforms 
introduced to boost employment levels have failed in their primary aim and have likely contributed 
to the increase in income distribution inequality.  
Finally, declining labour shares may have had side effects for aggregate demand. Indeed, 
changes in functional income distribution might influence the main components of aggregate 
demand and eventually, in a dynamic process, national income growth. Following the ILO (2013), 
it can be argued that the presumption that lower LS will have a beneficial effect on economic 
activity is misguided. For instance, the falling wage share may depress private consumption, 
because labour compensation is generally positively correlated with household consumption; 
although a substantial part of business profits contributes, through retained earnings, to generating 
future labour income. In addition, if falling real unit labour costs that ensure higher competitiveness 
in international markets boost export surpluses, higher profits do not necessarily ensure more 
productive investment, especially if financialisation diverts corporate economic resources away 
from the real economy.  
In this context, the sluggish labour share calls for political intervention. The key message is that 
deregulation of temporary contracts may lead to only transitory employment gains while exerting 
persistent offsetting effects on income distribution. Opposing policies, more favourable to the 
labour share, could sustain demand and actually boost growth. Real wage increases and increased 
job quality and living standards must be components of an integrated strategy along the lines 
suggested (but not sufficiently implemented) in “A Restated Job Strategy”, which in 2006 
advocated, as crucial issues, the necessity to “improve labour force skills and competences through 
wide-ranging changes in education and training systems” (OECD 2006, p.24). However, in the last 
few years, several countries have taken the opposite direction.  
Table 1: Summary statistics at country level (sector- and country-varying variables) 
Source: EUKLEMS and Eurostat. Notes: TFP is an index (due to missing data, for UK, NLD, and BEL, the respective 1998, 1999, and 2001 values of TFP replace the 1996 
values); 
Capital–output ratio is the nominal capital stock on the nominal value added at basic prices and national currency; all other values are expressed in percentages. Coefficient of 
variation (Cv)= standard deviation/mean. 
Country Stats Unadj. Labour Share Adj. Labour Share Capital/Output ratio Temp. Work. Share Turnover TFP (2010=100) EMPE 
  
1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 
AUT 
Mean 45.62 40.34 42.97 71.68 62.25 63.00 4.05 4.15 4.55 8.97 10.16 10.26 5.82 4.26 6.47 89.47 103.39 104.07 82.73 82.04 82.56 
Cv 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.64 0.57 0.50 0.75 0.80 0.81 0.58 0.50 0.50 0.82 0.72 1.16 0.21 0.09 0.07 0.35 0.33 0.32 
BEL 
Mean 46.59 45.00 52.51 60.68 54.92 56.67 5.04 5.14 5.87 5.12 8.18 7.48 8.23 5.33 6.52 91.09 101.16 97.82 75.97 79.38 87.42 
Cv 0.39 0.31 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.16 0.56 0.55 0.50 0.38 0.40 0.52 0.88 0.87 1.31 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.34 0.29 0.14 
CZE 
Mean 40.42 40.38 43.05 48.70 51.13 53.81 3.77 3.70 4.01 6.71 7.04 8.26 0.00 3.28 3.60 120.60 109.43 90.58 87.40 83.90 82.87 
Cv 0.32 0.22 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.85 0.64 0.56 0.38 0.36 0.44 0.00 0.92 0.66 0.53 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.14 
DNK 
Mean 45.84 49.75 48.24 55.47 59.95 56.20 3.78 4.35 4.09 11.40 8.59 8.55 6.93 6.13 3.15 107.58 107.44 98.01 87.35 89.42 89.64 
Cv 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.75 0.94 0.89 0.60 0.49 0.51 0.83 1.31 1.06 0.23 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.15 
ESP 
Mean 41.62 44.18 42.97 52.98 52.93 51.90 2.79 2.95 3.51 36.34 31.82 26.14 6.17 5.49 4.95 110.08 103.05 96.80 78.37 84.73 84.65 
Cv 0.42 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.84 0.69 0.61 0.49 0.49 0.58 0.90 0.76 0.99 0.26 0.04 0.11 0.26 0.17 0.16 
FIN 
Mean 48.96 45.57 51.14 69.26 61.87 65.75 3.25 2.98 3.29 15.66 13.03 12.23 11.52 6.27 2.41 83.39 101.67 98.04 80.38 82.49 82.99 
Cv 0.42 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.88 0.98 0.89 0.47 0.27 0.33 1.14 0.70 1.15 0.22 0.12 0.11 0.28 0.24 0.21 
FRA 
Mean 50.08 49.10 52.40 66.98 64.61 69.21 3.24 3.00 3.21 11.91 14.67 16.01 1.74 6.59 3.61 99.10 105.53 98.27 85.00 86.65 85.55 
Cv 0.32 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.32 0.31 1.23 0.99 0.98 0.42 0.37 0.39 1.34 0.90 0.86 0.21 0.10 0.05 0.23 0.20 0.20 
DEU 
Mean 63.92 53.86 54.93 83.75 70.32 69.74 3.62 3.29 3.25 10.77 14.70 11.58 5.64 3.71 4.57 88.73 104.16 100.00 84.35 84.47 85.80 
Cv 0.47 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.80 0.87 0.87 0.47 0.31 0.17 0.88 0.64 0.75 0.31 0.10 0.07 0.22 0.19 0.17 
ITA 
Mean 33.68 34.96 36.83 56.90 57.80 59.14 3.05 3.63 3.85 10.85 17.24 17.90 2.84 4.52 2.81 116.33 106.29 104.02 68.54 71.38 72.08 
Cv 0.37 0.31 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.74 0.72 0.67 0.96 0.88 0.97 0.90 0.83 1.20 0.24 0.09 0.14 0.28 0.25 0.24 
NLD 
Mean 45.09 40.59 44.24 63.86 56.25 61.03 2.75 2.61 2.88 12.76 21.08 21.82 5.19 11.07 9.90 100.31 102.90 97.48 81.78 83.73 83.21 
Cv 0.50 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.60 0.41 0.51 0.91 1.73 0.74 18.40 0.08 0.06 0.23 0.19 0.20 
SWE 
Mean 45.90 41.99 47.79 54.61 49.12 54.26 3.10 3.20 3.73 13.47 19.82 15.26 3.64 3.98 4.33 101.93 112.16 97.18 87.33 89.64 91.07 
Cv 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.71 0.82 0.74 0.58 0.58 0.71 1.16 0.88 1.10 0.25 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.17 0.17 
UK 
Mean 42.15 51.00 50.82 56.65 65.41 66.78 2.45 2.66 2.90 6.84 5.00 5.26 3.41 4.83 3.52 98.81 106.23 95.32 81.74 82.91 80.86 
Cv 0.45 0.36 0.32 0.46 0.39 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.36 0.38 0.37 1.38 1.42 0.85 0.20 0.07 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.20 
Total 
Mean 46.06 44.87 46.94 61.79 59.45 60.57 3.59 3.59 3.88 12.51 13.81 13.16 4.81 5.25 4.93 101.91 105.28 98.14 81.85 83.28 83.85 
Cv 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.76 0.75 0.72 0.87 0.77 0.75 1.24 1.29 1.15 0.31 0.09 0.11 0.24 0.21 0.20 
  
Table 2: Employment protection of temporary contracts and unadjusted labour shares: 
Diff-in-diff estimates (1996–2007) 
 
Dependent Variable Unadjusted Labour Share 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ln(EPLT*TWS_bench) 0.369*** 0.351** 0.329** 0.430 0.129 0.587 
 (0.079) (0.173) (0.150) (0.442) (0.894) (1.014) 
ln(Capital/output ratio) 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
ln(TFP) –0.861*** –0.860*** –0.794*** –0.795*** –0.794*** –0.825*** 
 (0.086) (0.088) (0.042) (0.077) (0.058) (0.075) 
ln(EMPE) 0.942*** 0.941*** 0.859*** 0.857*** 0.858*** 0.864*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.055) (0.046) (0.046) (0.058) 
ln(EPLR*TO_bench) 
 
–0.075 0.04 
   
 
 
(0.755) (0.717) 
   ln(PMR) 
  
0.501*** 0.502*** 0.501*** 0.503*** 
 
  
(0.047) (0.052) (0.033) (0.033) 
ln(UD*TO_bench) 
   
0.461 
  
 
   
(1.867) 
  ln(BC* TO_bench) 
    
–0.800 
 
 
    
(3.761) 
 ln(UB* TO_bench)      0.937 
      (4.196) 
Country*Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_squared 0.639 0.639 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.724 
Obs 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,045 
 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. OLS with bootstrapped standard 
errors in parentheses.  
 
Table 3: Employment protection of temporary contracts and labour shares: Diff-in-diff 
estimates (1996–2013) 
 
Dependent Variable Unadjusted Labour Share 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ln(EPLT*TWS_bench) 0.347*** 0.446*** 0.409*** 0.408*** 0.409*** 0.424*** 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.046) (0.052) (0.044) (0.071) 
ln(k) 0.175*** 0.161*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.137*** 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
ln(TFP) –0.587*** –0.666*** –0.647*** –0.646*** –0.647*** –0.644*** 
 (0.066) (0.086) (0.037) (0.064) (0.049) (0.059) 
ln(EMPE) 0.763*** 0.817*** 0.752*** 0.753*** 0.752*** 0.733*** 
 (0.031) (0.039) (0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) 
Crisis (1/0) 0.178 –0.135 0.004 0.062 0.004 0.036 
 (0.128) (0.097) (0.104) (0.116) (0.088) (0.092) 
ln(EPLR* TO_bench) 
 
0.531*** 0.477*** 
   
 
 
(0.121) (0.095) 
   ln(PMR) 
  
0.486*** 0.487*** 0.486*** 0.490*** 
 
  
(0.027) (0.033) (0.039) (0.021) 
ln(UD* TO_bench) 
   
0.477*** 
  
 
   
(0.104) 
  ln(BC* TO_bench) 
    
0.475*** 
 
 
    
(0.108) 
 ln(UB* TO_bench)      0.462*** 
      (0.083) 
Country*Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R_squared 0.587 0.602 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.684 
Obs 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,692 
 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. OLS with bootstrapped standard 
errors in parentheses.  
 
Table 4: Employment protection of temporary contracts and adjusted labour shares: Diff-
in-diff estimates (1996–2007) 
 
Dependent Variable Adjusted Labour Share 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ln(EPLT*TWS_bench) 0.674*** 0.538*** 0.562*** 0.827 0.48 0.999 
 (0.050) (0.199) (0.180) (0.626) (0.876) (0.903) 
ln(Capital/output ratio) 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022) 
ln(TFP) –0.930*** –0.932*** –0.883*** –0.884*** –0.883*** –0.928*** 
 (0.092) (0.081) (0.053) (0.052) (0.049) (0.076) 
ln(EPLR*TO_bench) 
 
–0.568 –0.578 
   
 
 
(0.550) (0.800) 
   ln(PMR) 
  
0.489*** 0.487*** 0.489*** 0.491*** 
 
  
(0.042) (0.041) (0.037) (0.050) 
ln(UD* TO_bench) 
   
0.532 
  
 
   
(2.586) 
  ln(BC* TO_bench) 
    
–0.924 
 
 
    
(3.755) 
 ln(UB* TO_bench)      1.078 
      (3.755) 
Country*Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_squared 0.621 0.621 0.712 0.712 0.712 0.711 
Obs 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,045 
 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. OLS with bootstrapped standard 
errors in parentheses.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Employment protection of temporary contracts and adjusted labour shares: Diff-
in-diff estimates (1996–2013) 
 
Dependent Variable Adjusted Labour Share 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ln(EPLT*TWS_bench) 0.778*** 0.848*** 0.866*** 0.865*** 0.868*** 0.897*** 
 (0.067) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.054) 
ln(Capital/output ratio) 0.195*** 0.172*** 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) 
ln(TFP) –0.682*** –0.767*** –0.765*** -0.763*** –0.762*** –0.778*** 
 (0.086) (0.061) (0.050) (0.037) (0.060) (0.078) 
Crisis (1/0) 0.336** -0.082 0.06 0.138 0.06 0.096 
 (0.155) (0.181) (0.154) (0.174) (0.183) (0.140) 
ln(EPLR* TO_bench) 
 
0.673*** 0.640*** 
   
 
 
(0.141) (0.098) 
   ln(PMR) 
  
0.471*** 0.473*** 0.470*** 0.474*** 
 
  
(0.030) (0.027) (0.022) (0.028) 
ln(UD* TO_bench) 
   
0.640*** 
  
 
   
(0.132) 
  ln(BC* TO_bench) 
    
0.642*** 
 
 
    
(0.109) 
 ln(UB* TO_bench)      0.637*** 
      (0.099) 
Country*Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_squared 0.56 0.584 0.667 0.667 0.667 0.663 
Obs 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,692 
 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. OLS with bootstrapped standard 
errors in parentheses.  
  
 
 Table 6: Temporary workers share, turnover, and unadjusted labour shares: Fixed Effects 
(FE) and GMM-SYS Estimators (1996–2013) 
 
Dependent Variable Unadjusted Labour Share 
 FE GMM_SYS 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 1 2 3 
ln(Temp.Work.Share)_TWS –0.022 
 
–0.019 –0.233*** 
 
–0.057 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) (0.082) 
 
(0.078) 
ln(Turnover)_TO 
 
–0.003* –0.004** 
 
–0.021* –0.007 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.011) (0.007) 
ln(k) 0.458*** 0.528*** 0.463*** 0.241** 0.298** 0.237** 
 (0.065) (0.073) (0.065) (0.118) (0.147) (0.092) 
ln(TFP) –0.206*** –0.161** –0.202*** –0.383* –0.569* –0.430** 
 
(0.061) (0.079) (0.055) (0.202) (0.305) (0.184) 
ln(EMPE) 0.764*** 0.693*** 0.740*** 0.625*** 0.201 0.836*** 
 
(0.120) (0.117) (0.118) (0.208) (0.289) (0.171) 
ln(PMR) 0.085 0.035 0.091* 0.229 0.563*** 0.195 
 
(0.056) (0.060) (0.054) (0.226) (0.213) (0.198) 
Sector-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments for differences eq.    k, TWS, and TO with lags  
Instruments for levels eq.    k, TWS, and TO  
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test_pvalue 
 
   0.021 0.014 0.015 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test_pvalue 
 
   0.676 0.540 0.584 
Hansen test_pvalue    0.98 0.99 1.000 
R_squared 0.589 0.542 0.593    
Groups 101 108 101 101 108 101 
Obs 1,629 1,811 1,604 1,629 1,811 1,604 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  
  
Table 7: Temporary workers share, turnover, and unadjusted labour shares: Dynamic 
Fixed Effects (DFE) and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group Estimator (CCE) (1996–
2013) 
 
Dependent Variable Unadjusted Labour Share 
 DFE CCE 
Long-Run Coefficients 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ln(TWS) 0.106 
 
–0.166*** –0.068 
 
–0.153* 
 (0.070) 
 
(0.062) (0.053) 
 
(0.090) 
ln(Turnover) 
 
–0.003 0.002 
 
–0.007 –0.008 
 
 
(0.009) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.011) 
ln(k) 
0.386*** 0.563*** 0.527*** 0.506*** 0.583*** 0.345** 
 
(0.105) (0.086) (0.080) (0.112) (0.133) (0.177) 
ln(TFP) –0.165* –0.272** –0.322*** –0.157* –0.124 0.173 
 (0.092) (0.118) (0.094) (0.090) (0.125) (0.169) 
ln(EMPE) 0.643*** 0.630*** 0.837*** –0.058 0.140 –0.008 
 (0.132) (0.178) (0.175) (0.122) (0.122) (0.007) 
ln(PMR) 0.05 0.151 0.165 –0.019 0.404*** 0.071 
 (0.073) (0.113) (0.101) (0.149) (0.153) (0.178) 
Short-Run Coefficients 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Error Correction Mechanisms –0.192*** 0.159*** 0.173*** –0.930*** –0.690*** –0.409*** 
       
 (0.054) (0.040) (0.046) (0.128) (0.090) (0.075) 
ln(TWS) –0.018*  -0.024*** –0.066*  –0.074** 
 (0.010)  (0.009) (0.040)  (0.034) 
ln(Turnover) –0.192*** 0.159*** 0.173***  –0.001 –0.001 
 (0.054) (0.040) (0.046)  –0.003 –0.003 
ln(k) 0.646*** 0.756*** 0.699*** 0.545*** 0.558*** 0.490*** 
 (0.078) (0.069) (0.082) (0.090) (0.104) (0.093) 
ln(TFP) –0.038 –0.079 –0.102* –0.347*** –0.160** –0.027 
 (0.053) (0.061) (0.059) (0.074) (0.069) (0.054) 
ln(EMPE) 0.343** 0.219* 0.413*** 0.257** 0.353*** 0.080 
 (0.148) (0.123) (0.155) (0.100) (0.114) (0.061) 
ln(PMR) –0.022 –0.021 –0.007 0.121 0.139 –0.035 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.077) (0.128) (0.064) 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Groups 95 107 82 95 107 82 
Obs 1,565 1,732 1,358 1,565 1,732 1,358 
Notes: DFE developed by Blackburne and Frank (2007); CCE developed by Pesaran (2006); cluster adjusted 
standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Figure 1: Temporary Workers and Unadjusted Labour Share in Germany, The Netherlands, and Austria 
 
Source: Eurostat; EUKLEMS.
Figure 2: Temporary Workers and Unadjusted Labour Share in Belgium, Finland, and Sweden 
 
Source: Eurostat; EUKLEMS.
Figure 3: Temporary Workers and Unadjusted Labour Share in France, Italy, and Spain 
 
Source: Eurostat; EUKLEMS.
Figure 4: Temporary Workers and Unadjusted Labour Share in France, Italy, and Spain 
 
Source: Eurostat; EUKLEMS.
 Figure 5: Shift and Share Analysis of Unadjusted Labour Share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EUKLEMS.
Unadjusted Labour Share Changes between 1996 and 2007 
 
Unadjusted Labour Share Changes between 2007 and 2013 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Indicators between 1996 and 2013 
 
 
Source: OECD.
 
Table A.1 Description of variables 
Unadj. Labour Share  
Compensation of employees/ value added (sector–country-level data) 
Source: EU KLEMS database 
Adj. Labour Share 
 
Compensation of employees and self-employed /value added (sector–country-level data) 
Source: EU KLEMS database. 
Capital/Output ratio 
(k) 
Capital Stock to value added (sector–country-level data) 
Source: EU KLEMS database 
TFP  
Total Factor Productivity index, 2010=100, (sector–country-level data) 
Source: EU KLEMS database 
Employees/Total 
Employment 
(EMPE) 
Share of employees in total employment (sector–country-level data) 
Source: EU KLEMS database 
Temp. Work. Share 
(TWS) 
Share of temporary workers in total employees (sector–country-level data). 
Source: EUROSTAT database 
TWS_benchmark 
Frictionless sectoral temporary workers’ share (sector-level data). Ciccone and Papaioannou 
(2010) methodology. 
Source: EUROSTAT database 
Turnover (TO) 
Net job turnover as proxy for job reallocation (sector–country-level data). 
Source: EUROSTAT database 
TO_benchmark 
Frictionless job reallocation (sector-level data). Ciccone and Papaioannou (2010) 
methodology. 
Source: EUROSTAT database 
EPLT  
Employment protection of temporary workers (fixed-term and temporary employment). The 
index includes information on the valid cases for which these types of contracts are legal, 
restrictions on the number of renewals, and their maximum cumulated duration (country-level 
data). 
Source: OECD 
EPLR 
 
Employment protection of regular workers against individual dismissal. The index refers to 
eight items which weigh three groups of restrictions: i) procedural inconvenience (such as 
notification procedures), ii) severance pay, and iii) difficulty of individual dismissals, 
definition of unfair dismissal, and related items (country-level data). 
Source: OECD  
UD 
Union density rates (the share of union members in the employed dependent labour force 
(country-level data). 
Source: ICTWSS database (Visser 2016) 
BC 
Share of employees covered by wage bargaining agreements (country-level data). 
Source: ICTWSS database (Visser 2016) 
PMR 
Regulation Impact Indicator: Regulations in service sectors and their impact on downstream 
industries (sector–country-level data). 
Source: OECD 
UB 
Unemployment benefits per participant to the labour market intervention, thousands of euros 
PPP (country-level data). 
 Source: EUROSTAT database 
 
 
 
  
Table A.2: Summary statistics at sector level (sector- and country-varying variables) 
 
Source: EUKLEMS and Eurostat. Notes:  TFP is an index, all other values are expressed in percentages. TWS_benc and TO_benc are estimated exogenous benchmarks for 
temporary workers’ share and turnover, according to Equations (3) and (4) (Cingano et al. 2010). Coefficient of variation (Cv)= standard deviation/mean. 
 
 
 
Sector Stats Unadj. Labour Share Adj. Labour Share Capital/Output ratio TFP (2010=100) 
Temp. Work. Share 
(TWS) 
TWS
benc. 
Turnover (TO) 
TO 
benc. 
  1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 
1996-
2013 
1996 2007 2013 
1996-
2013 
Agriculture 
Mean 21.44 27.99 30.20 84.37 89.89 81.01 4.28 5.16 5.62 73.21 100.02 102.94 23.46 24.44 23.59 5.60 6.69 5.77 9.80 6.37 
Cv 0.50 0.38 0.31 0.46 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.61 0.65 0.74  0.72 0.82 1.00  
Mining 
Mean 42.66 35.24 37.67 40.72 35.24 39.54 4.06 3.72 4.18 111.34 108.09 88.61 15.01 14.57 8.67 7.00 3.02 13.43 10.54 11.39 
Cv 0.53 0.63 0.54 0.55 0.65 0.53 0.69 0.66 0.49 0.34 0.16 0.24 0.53 0.94 0.57 
 
1.60 1.13 0.71 
 
Manufacturing 
Mean 56.93 52.90 54.76 61.86 56.63 58.21 2.35 2.27 2.25 77.35 102.65 102.13 8.03 9.50 9.09 1.09 1.77 1.39 1.82 2.71 
Cv 0.14 0.20 0.19 0.12 0.21 0.20 0.78 0.57 0.37 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.84 0.53 0.38 
 
1.27 0.89 0.59 
 
Electricity & 
Gas 
Mean 34.93 32.30 32.79 32.09 32.67 33.84 6.03 6.09 6.34 109.71 107.92 91.22 6.20 10.33 9.79 5.72 4.26 7.81 6.59 5.93 
Cv 0.37 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.19 0.23 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.54 0.47 0.42 
 
1.28 0.72 0.50 
 
Construction 
Mean 60.93 56.45 58.74 81.02 77.47 80.54 1.43 1.93 1.69 123.65 107.74 96.60 13.73 13.62 12.97 4.33 3.32 3.35 4.04 5.88 
Cv 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.75 1.21 1.04 0.16 0.07 0.06 1.10 0.91 0.56 
 
1.02 0.91 1.13 
 
Wholesale & 
Retail Trade 
Mean 53.47 57.06 61.88 77.39 74.43 78.81 2.09 1.51 1.95 133.21 109.66 99.69 19.46 20.25 21.87 1.53 3.36 5.08 3.35 1.69 
Cv 0.30 0.20 0.19 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.93 0.48 0.80 0.41 0.08 0.04 0.63 0.58 0.55 
 
1.35 0.71 0.92 
 
Hotels & 
Restaurants 
Mean 54.42 55.38 58.70 69.75 67.35 70.53 1.15 1.23 1.83 83.23 102.93 100.97 10.79 12.27 11.85 6.40 3.59 3.19 2.10 4.05 
Cv 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.42 0.45 1.24 0.22 0.05 0.03 0.86 0.51 0.43 
 
2.27 0.69 1.28 
 
Transports & 
Communic. 
Mean 54.56 51.95 53.06 63.49 59.37 60.09 3.24 3.13 3.34 94.01 103.52 101.90 6.84 8.82 9.16 0.40 3.22 2.12 2.73 2.47 
Cv 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.66 0.46 0.47 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.69 0.69 0.55 
 
1.17 0.78 1.03 
 
Finance & 
Profess. Activ. 
Mean 32.25 34.54 35.24 40.08 42.04 43.02 7.53 7.29 7.89 111.49 105.02 99.56 9.81 10.54 8.48 0.59 11.46 5.11 3.62 1.58 
Cv 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.34 0.30 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.71 0.53 0.47 
 
2.97 0.48 0.72 
 
Total 
Mean 46.06 44.87 46.94 61.79 59.45 60.57 3.59 3.59 3.88 101.91 105.28 98.14 12.51 13.81 13.16 3.78 4.81 5.25 4.93 4.27 
Cv 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.78 0.77 0.73 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.52 0.45 0.50 0.68 0.93 0.97 0.99 0.72 
  
 
 
Table A.3: Average annual growth of added value and compensation of employees 
(constant prices 2010)  
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 1996–2007 2007–2013 
Country Added Value 
(var. %) 
Labour Compensation 
(var. %) 
Added Value 
(var. %) 
Labour Compensation 
(var. %) 
AUT 3.93 2.54 0.14 0.91 
BEL 3.65 3.45 0.17 0.92 
CZE 5.44 6.18 –0.02 0.70 
DEU 2.15 5.82 0.15 0.14 
DNK 3.31 8.64 –0.30 –1.66 
ESP 4.85 2.40 –1.19 1.38 
FIN 7.13 4.21 –0.82 0.41 
FRA 3.60 0.63 0.04 1.14 
ITA 2.10 2.66 –1.01 –0.38 
NLD 4.45 3.92 –0.19 0.19 
SWE 6.40 5.93 0.28 1.16 
UK 4.04 5.53 –0.21 –0.17 
Table A.4: Labour Market and Product Market Institution Indicators 
 
Country EPLT EPLR 
Union Density 
(UD) 
Bargaining Coverage 
(BC) 
Unemployment Benefits 
(UB; .000 Euros_ppp) 
Prod. Market Regulation 
(PMR) 
 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 1996 2007 2013 
AUT 1.31 1.31 1.31 2.75 2.37 2.37 41.06 29.94 27.40 98.00 98.00 98.00 14.24 14.83 14.35 0.26 0.16 0.12 
BEL 4.63 2.38 2.38 1.85 1.89 1.89 52.79 54.65 55.11 96.00 96.00 96.00 7.18 7.71 7.14 0.27 0.20 0.18 
CZE 0.50 1.13 1.44 3.31 3.05 2.92 43.52 17.91 12.72 65.73 50.35 47.29 2.73 4.15 5.24 0.24 0.14 0.13 
DNK 1.38 1.38 1.38 2.13 2.13 2.20 75.86 67.94 66.77 85.00 81.00 84.00 17.14 18.54 18.30 0.18 0.11 0.09 
ESP 3.25 3.00 2.56 2.36 2.36 2.05 16.79 15.53 16.88 90.94 76.40 77.58 12.57 13.08 11.37 0.25 0.14 0.11 
FIN 1.25 1.56 1.56 2.45 2.17 2.17 80.44 70.50 69.04 83.00 88.00 93.00 8.02 9.48 10.40 0.17 0.14 0.14 
FRA 3.63 3.63 3.63 2.34 2.47 2.38 8.71 7.55 7.72 93.44 97.72 98.00 9.45 11.73 10.58 0.26 0.18 0.15 
DEU 3.13 1.00 1.13 2.68 2.68 2.68 29.22 19.89 17.71 80.75 61.65 57.60 15.06 9.35 9.19 0.22 0.12 0.11 
ITA 4.75 2.00 2.00 2.76 2.76 2.68 38.07 33.99 37.27 80.00 80.00 80.00 4.92 17.15 16.81 0.28 0.18 0.14 
NLD 1.38 0.94 0.94 2.84 2.88 2.82 25.25 19.35 18.03 80.02 79.03 84.84 14.04 15.11 13.73 0.19 0.10 0.08 
SWE 1.77 1.44 0.81 2.80 2.61 2.61 86.62 71.04 67.38 94.00 91.00 89.00 9.15 7.69 8.39 0.14 0.09 0.07 
UK 0.25 0.38 0.38 1.10 1.26 1.10 34.43 27.35 25.67 36.00 34.60 29.50 4.41 3.87 2.88 0.14 0.07 0.06 
Total 2.01 1.57 1.53 2.34 2.28 2.20 44.92 34.41 33.29 75.71 73.94 71.31 9.67 10.55 9.99 0.21 0.13 0.12 
 
Source: OECD; Eurostat; ICTWSS (v. 5.1).
 Table A.5: Pesaran’s Tests: weak cross-sectional dependence and panel unit roots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Weak cross-sectional dependence (Pesaran 2015), H0: errors are weakly 
cross-sectional dependent. 
Pesaran’s Cross-Sectional Dependence Test 
 
CD p-value 
ln(Unadjusted labour share)  32.879 0.000 
ln(TWS) 19.410 0.000 
ln(Turnover) 7.512 0.000 
ln(k) 39.026 0.000 
ln(TFP) 41.728 0.000 
ln(EMPE) 3.428 0.000 
ln(PMR) 235.716 0.000 
Residuals 12.247 0.000 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1: Gross hourly wage disparities between temporary and regular workers in sectors and countries 
 
  
 
Source: Eurostat, Structure of Earnings Survey, years 2002, 2006, 2014. 
 
Figure A.2: Temporary workers’ share (TWS) and unadjusted labour share (LS) in manufacturing and construction 
 
Countries with high (and decreasing) EPLT and high EPLR Countries with low EPLT and high EPLR 
  
 
Source: Eurostat and EUKLEMS
  
 
Figure A.3: Temporary workers’ share (TWS) and unadjusted labour share (LS) in manufacturing and construction 
 
Source: Eurostat and EUKLEMS.
Countries with low EPLT and low EPLR Spain 
  
                                                       
i To our knowledge only Deakin et al. (2014) analyse the influence of an ample set of policies regulating 
non-standard employment contracts on LS. They find that the stringency of these policies has a positive 
effect on LS in the short run. However, the authors do not take into account the role played by capital 
intensity and technological change.  
ii According to Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003) changes of capital-output ratio affect labour share as follows,  
dLS/dk= − (1+)  (k*), where <0 is the elasticity of labour demand with respect to wages. Therefore dLS/dk>0 if 
 
iii Country–time and sector dummies capture all other potential determinants of LS mentioned in the 
literature, such as unemployment rate, minimum wage, globalization and trade, and industry concentration. 
For reasons of appropriate identification in the difference-in-difference approach (i.e., the difficulty of 
choosing a reliable benchmark for country-level trade-openness, unemployment rate, and minimum wage) or 
data availability (minimum wage and industry concentration), we had to exclude these supplementary 
explanatory variables. 
iv We use the interchangeable terms ‘intrinsic’, ‘natural’, and ‘frictionless’ to underline that the propensity to 
employ temporary workers or reallocate jobs does not depend on institutions but only on technological and 
other idiosyncratic industry characteristics. 
v Two main reasons underlie the choice of using a different benchmark for EPLT than for EPLR and 
Oth.LMIs. First, EPLT focuses exclusively on the hiring restrictions of fixed-term and temporary work 
agency employment. Since TWS exactly measures the fraction of the labour force with these characteristics, 
it seems to be a more precise benchmark indicator than job turnover rate, which instead reassumes 
differences between job destruction and creation. Secondly, the job turnover rate basically captures the 
change in employment caused by job destruction and creation. However, many authors highlight that there 
can be co-presence of low job flows (low job turnover) and high worker flows (i.e., more than one worker 
joins and leaves the same job position in a given time span) if the share of temporary workers is sizeable 
(Bellmann et al. 2017). Therefore, the temporary worker share, which is a different phenomenon that EPLT 
is supposed to regulate  is much more correlated with worker turnover. 
vi This is a weighted mean of EPLR and EPLT: see OECD (2013). 
vii For example, according to Acemoglu (2003), changes of the shares of income paid to each factor may 
influence the incentive to innovate (TFP) and to invest (k). 
viii We keep product market regulation (PMR) due to sector–country-level availability and good variability 
across time. Other institutional variables are captured by country-by-time dummies. 
ix Since we do not have long series, no stationarity test has been performed. However, the estimators we use 
in the error correction model are supposed to be consistent with either stationarity or non-stationarity 
(Pesaran, 2006). 
x The capital stock data included in the 2017 EUKLEMS release are different from the previous ones and 
follow a statistical module where capital stocks are taken directly from Eurostat. TFP in EUKLEMS 
measures the portion of output growth not attributable to inputs and their measured quality. Hence, TFP 
proxies pure technological changes (not embodied in inputs), organizational improvements, measurement 
errors, and mark-ups (van Ark et al. 2008). 
xi Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
xii 1) Agriculture, 2) Mining and Quarrying, 3) Manufacturing, 4) Energy, 5) Construction, 6) Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 7) Hotels and Restaurants, 8) Transport, Storage, and Communications, 9) Financial 
Intermediation, Real Estate, and Business Services. 
xiii Italy is another exception, despite the strong increase in the percentage of temporary workers, both 
unadjusted and adjusted labour share rose by 1 percentage point between 1996 and 2007. 
xiv We can better understand this LS reversal during the crisis by separately examining the movement of its 
components; i.e., added value and employee compensation. Table A.3 in the Appendix clearly shows that in 
almost all countries the average annual growth of employee compensation increased more (or declined less) 
than the added value.  
xv Data used for Figure A.1 comes from the Eurostat-Structure of Earning Survey in which the reference 
years do not match exactly those reported in our descriptive statistics. We did our best to choose SES 
reference years closer to ours. SES is also used by EUKLEMS (2017, p.10) to estimate labour composition. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
xvi A particular case in point is Spain, where the liberalisation of temporary contracts was adopted in 
1984, and in the early 1990s, after a dramatic burst of temporary jobs, a series of countervailing 
EPL reforms was adopted to offset some of the undesirable consequences of the 1984 reform 
(Bentolila et al., 2012). In any case, in our sampled period we also observe a reduction in EPLT for 
this country (from 3.25 in 1996 to 2.56 in 2013, see also Table A.4). 
xvii This overall impact results from 0.329*[(2.97*0.46)*100]=45%. 
xviii As mentioned above, TFP in our specific case, might capture organizational changes and mark-up that 
favour only the firm’s profit without affecting labour returns (Autor et al., 2017). 
xix Future research on the role of the interaction between product and labour market regulation could be 
useful to test if these regulations are linked by a substitutability or a complementarity relationship (Amable 
et al., 2011). 
xx This result probably reflects the high correlation normally found between self-employment and temporary 
workers in sectors where the propensity to employ flexible labour is higher (i.e., construction, hotel and 
restaurants, agriculture). Since in our specification the higher this propensity is the more EPLT positively 
influences LS, it is plausible that (EPLT*TWS_Bench) coefficients are greater in magnitude when the 
dependent variable is the labour share adjusted for the self-employment.  
xxi We obtain positive and significant coefficients for capital–output ratio and negative and significant 
coefficients for TFP. These results are very stable and do not change even in specifications that only include 
k and TFP as explanatory variables of LS. Results of these regressions are available upon request. 
xxii The Hansen and Arellano-Bond tests do not reject the hypothesis of the validity of instruments (see the 
bottom of Table 6) when we instrument difference and level equations with lags and differences, 
respectively, of k, TWS, and TO. 
xxiii On the one hand this result reinforces our main outcome, i.e., excessive adjustment costs are bad for 
labour share but a strong liberalisation of temporary contracts is not the right solution; on the other hand it 
seems to contradict our previous results in Tables 3 and 5, where protection for regular workers 
(EPLR*TO_bench) also fosters the labour share. Further research is needed on this point, which however 
remains marginal in our case, where temporary workers are the main interest.  
xxiv For the sake of readability, we omitted results for the cross-section averages of dependent and 
independent variables that add to the CCE estimates (Pesaran, 2006). 
xxv Piketty’s extensive work has analysed the long-run trends of capital share and income inequality. 
However, Piketty’s work adopts a broader definition of capital, and capital and wealth are interchangeable 
terms. Our contribution follows the vast literature on LS and only considers capital as a factor of production. 
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